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Countries can reduce global emissions by reducing own consumption since they are linked to 
the total value of consumption world wide. Two effects are at issue: a utility loss from 
forgone consumption and a utility gain from lowered temperature change. It is thus unclear 
whether own country emissions reductions are in the self interest; typically they are not for 
small countries, but may be for larger countries. Here are investigate the incentives for 
individual large population low wage rapidly growing countries in the BRIC group (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) and the groups of countries as a sub-global coalition. We also assess 
what level of other countries’ trade measures linked to non participation is needed to induce 
compliance as an all or nothing discrete choice. We capture induced changes in the global 
trade equilibrium in our analysis, as well as participation linked to financial transfers. Our 
results suggest that only very high tariffs over a hundred percent by all other countries, or 
even higher tariffs by the OECD alone, could induce participation by BRIC countries, 
especially when the country is a net exporter. Equally, large financial transfers would be 
needed. 
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1.  Introduction  
In this paper we explore what might induce the participation of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (the BRICs) in global climate change negotiations. In the current 
global negotiation situation in which arrangements for a post-Kyoto regime are to be 
worked out in Copenhagen in 2009 in a further UNFCCC negotiation, the 
participation of the largest non OECD global emitters is seen as especially key. But it 
has been noted extensively in the literature on international environmental agreements 
(see Barrett (1994)) that country own incentives to participate in negotiations on them 
are small since the benefits of country actions to internalize externalities accrue to all 
countries while the costs are borne solely by the country itself. Shapley and Shubik 
(1967) characterize this as the possibility that the core in an externality game maybe 
empty.  
Cai, Riezman and Whalley (2008) have recently developed a numerical 
simulation capability using a formulation related to that in Uzawa (2004) to explore in 
a calibrated global warming model at what levels of global damage and speeds of 
temperature change participation would be in the self interest of large countries or 
regions. Here we use an extended version of this framework to explore what level of 
trade measures against them and by whom can induce participation, using trade 
measures as a penalty to non-participation. We also explore the related issue of the 
size of financial transfers that would also induce participation. 
We first present our analytical model. We consider multiple regions (US, EU, 
China, India, Brazil, Russia, others), each of whom have preferences defined over 
goods and (negatively in ways we set out below) over damage from temperature 
change. Each country is endowed with a single good and goods are heterogeneous 
across countries (the Armington (1969) assumption). This latter feature captures trade      3
and allows us to analyze the impact of trade sanctions which reduce foreign purchases 
of their own good. 
In the model, countries can reduce global emissions by forgoing consumption 
since they are linked to the total value of consumption world wide. In this way, they 
induce lowered world temperature change for all, but at a cost to themselves. The 
model thus allows us to evaluate whether own country emissions reductions are in the 
self interest of individual countries (or groups of countries as sub-global coalitions). 
This structure also captures the impacts of country actions on trade or financial 
transfers between countries with induced changes in the global trade equilibrium. We 
can thus also evaluate the impact of trade sanctions by individual countries or groups 
of countries or financial transfers linked to participation by BRIC countries as an all 
or nothing discrete choice. 
We use data on emissions and GDP by countries for 2006, and also data on 
average annual country growth rates over the period 2004-2006 to construct 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios for the 50 year period 2006-2056. In our model 
analysis we alternatively treat each of these groups of years as a single period for the 
purposes of model analysis. Effectively, we use single period analysis, but the period 
is 30, 50 or 80 years.   
We also include in this structure a function relating temperature change to 
emissions growth which we calibrate to conjectures advanced in the Stern (2006) 
report of 3℃ temperature change within 30 years and 5￿ temperature change in 50 
years under BAU. We use alternative estimates of global damage (assumed 
equi-proportional for all countries) from these temperature changes suggested in Stern 
(or up to 20% world product by 2050) and by Mendelsohon (2007) (of less than 1% of 
world product by 2050) to calibrate preferences toward temperature change. In our      4
formulation these embody the damage costs of climate change in welfare form. 
Our results suggest that given the Armington treatment and an extreme 
endowment assumption (countries are endowed only with their own goods) there are 
always trade sanctions on net importers that induce participation. But only very high 
tariffs of several hundred percent by all other countries, or even higher tariffs by the 
OECD alone can induce participation by the rapid growing non OECD BRIC 
countries. Equally, large financial transfers would be needed to encourage developing 
countries’ join in the agreement.   
And these also vary with assumed substitution elasticities in preferences and 
critically depend on the assumed damage associated with climate change and on 
whether PPP measure, discount growth or emission reduction cost has been taken into 
consideration. A country’s likelihood of participation also increases the larger the 
number of other countries who make financial transfer to them. 
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2.  Theoretical Analysis-N country N good case with temperature change 
Global warming negotiations aim at achieving joint carbon emission abatement in 
the presence of externality effects across countries. The first round of global 
negotiations in this vein concluded in Kyoto 1997, and now continue in the current 
post Bali road map negotiations set to conclude in Copenhagen in 2009 with 
agreement for the period after 2012. These negotiations aim to achieve joint mutual 
agreement to act, and will only conclude when all parties accept each others 
commitments. More detailed discussion of these negotiations is given in Walsh and 
Whalley (2008) and Tian and Whalley (2008).   
In this paper, we focus on the incentives to participate in negotiation, rather than 
the outcome of such negotiations; effectively what level of trade policy (explicit trade 
sanctions) and financial transfers can induce participation. We begin with the N good, 
N country case. Empirically based analyses follow. 
 The literature by Debreu and Scarf (1967) and Shapley and Shubik (1969) 
suggests that collective global agreement on carbon emission reduction where side 
payments do not occur may not be feasible since the number of countries participating 
in the agreement would need to be small to achieve mutual agreement since each 
country can free-ride without any punishment. The likelihood of positive participation 
also depends critically on the severity of damage from the externality.   
Cai, Riezman and Whalley (2008) explore in a calibrated global warming model 
that international trade can be a positive factor in motivating international negotiation 
on climate change. We further develop Cai, Riezman and Whalley’s model and take 
tariffs and financial transfers into consideration. We use data on consumption and 
trade for these economies and along with country growth profiles analyze changes in 
various damage and temperature change assumptions for business as usual scenarios      6
and undertake numerical investigation with our analytical structure. The base data is 
for a single 50 year period 2006-2056 with assumed yearly growth rates over the 
period. We use calibration to a temperature change function for prospective changes 
in temperature under a business as usual scenario out to 2056, and use varying 
estimates of associated damage over the ranges reported by Stern (2007) and 
Mendelsohn (2007).   
 
2.1 Temperature change and top level utility function 
We analyze a single period of a number of years during which each economy 
grows. We assume that consumption of the good by the country directly generates 
emissions of carbon which in turn raise global temperature. Countries receive positive 
utility from consumption but negative utility from temperature change. Countries thus 
have an upper bound on own consumption reflecting a BAU scenario, and if they 
consumes less than the upper bound they experience less temperature change. If they 
are small, their own actions have little or no effect on temperature change. 
As we will later work with the impacts of agreements to reduce carbon emissions 
over a given period of time, the single period model covers 50 years. In this 50 year 
period, we focus on changes in consumption (use of own and foreign goods) and 
utility, and measure changes in these variables relative to the outcome of zero growth 
over the period. The utility function is thus defined over 50 year changes in 
consumption and temperature change. Potential use of the good reflects changes in 
potential output from the economy over 50 years. We first analyze a business as usual 
(BAU) scenario which reflects current observed growth rates remaining unchanged 
over 50 years, and with no global or single country emissions limitation initiatives in 
place.       7
The utility of each country is reflected in a utility change function with arguments 
given by its own change in composite consumption as well as the temperature change 
of the world. Without loss of generality, we initially assume the utility change 
function for each country has a Cobb-Douglas form given by (1) and later use CES 
and alternative forms.   




UU R C TR C
C
β −Δ
Δ= ΔΔ Δ= Δ     ( 1 )  
In this specification,  i RC Δ represents change in the composite consumption good 
for each country i. C can be thought of the global temperature change at which all 
economic activity ceases (say 20℃). In this case, as  T Δ  approaches C, utility goes 
to zero, and, as  T Δ goes to zero there is no welfare impact of temperature change. 
Utility change over the model period (2006-2056) increases as temperature change 
falls. The share parameter  β  reflects the severity of damage (in utility terms) from 
temperature change, which we later calibrate to various damage estimates from 
business as usual global temperature change reported by Stern (2006) and 
Mendelsohn (2007).   
Global temperature change, in turn, is determined by the change in carbon 
emissions over the period across all countries in the model. We adopt a simple 
temperature change function and assume that emissions by each country equal the 
change in consumption times country emissions intensity (emissions/GDP) so as to 
allow for differing emissions intensities by country. Defining the emissions intensity 
of country i as  i e , we use a simple power function (2) for global temperature change 
due to changes in emissions by all countries over the model period. 
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In this case, i RS Δ represents the change in the sales (production) of the own good 
for each country i. Consumption in each country is given by  ii RCR S Δ ≤Δ  because 
of international trade.   
In this structure, a carbon reduction commitment by a single country implies a 
reduction in composite consumption, and this has both negative and positive effects 
on utility change for the countries over the model period. On the one hand, a 
reduction in consumption lowers utility for the country, but on the other hand, country 
consumption reductions lower global emissions and hence world temperature change, 
and increases the utility both of the country reducing the emissions and all other 
countries. 
 
2.2 Composite consumption goods by country 
The composite consumption good  i RC   is a CES function of domestic and 
imported consumption goods, which is similar that used in the nested CES Armington 
models (see Whalley (1985)). The model effectively becomes an Armington N good 
N country pure trade economy in which the endowment is variable.   
   M a x  
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− ==+             ( 3 )  
         s.t. 
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ii i i i i i pD PM I pR S +≤ =                          ( 4 )  
where i D and i M represent consumption of the domestic and a composite imported 
good respectively with 
w
i p and 
m
i P as their prices,  1
i λ  and 2
i λ  as the consumption 
shares, and  σ  as the substitution elasticity. The composition of  i M  is determined 
by the third level of the model, and 
m
i P  is a price index of seller’s prices 
w
j p (see 
equation (8)).        9
    Demands for domestic consumption goods and imported consumption goods are:       
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2.3 Composite of Imported Goods 
The CES composite commodities at the third level of nesting are composites of 
imported goods for each country. Given that each country has one good it can sell, but 
N-1 goods it consumes, the CES composite of other goods defines an import 
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where 
i
j R   is the imported good i by country j and 
m
i P   is the composite import 
price for country i, 
i
j κ  is the consumption share and  m σ is the second level 
substitution elasticity. As we have only one good for use in each country, the price of 
basic domestic goods 
d
i p defines the purchase price of the good. These reflect CES 
sub-utility maximization and are given as: 
1
1
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The model can be amended to capture emission costs by treating them as a 
percentage loss of output in country:        10
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where  i I is the income of country i, which is the sum of GDP, trade balance 
i BOT   and tariff revenue  i TI .  ϕ   is an emission reduction cost factor which enlarges 
or reduces emission costs.  i E Δ is the change in emissions along the BAU path; and 
i t   is the tariff rate on good i.  
      The model also can be amended to capture financial transfers by treating them 
as aid to countries i, being negative if country i is the source of transfers.   
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w ii
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The size of transfer, as a percentage of developing country’s GDP or percentage 
of developed countries’ GDP, or an exact amount transferred from developed 
countries is exogenous.   
 
2.4  Trade Equilibrium 
     Given  values  of  i RS Δ , a trade equilibrium is given by prices  1 ,...,
ww
N p p  for 
which global markets clear, i.e.   
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Thus, in this structure, when countries contemplate participating in global      11
environmental negotiations, if they reduce emissions by reducing GDP there will be 
general equilibrium implications for all prices and quantities. Importantly, tariffs and 
financial transfers will cause the price of their own good i to change giving a terms of 
trade impact for the country making the emission reduction. This will spread the 
burden of the country emissions reduction to all other countries reducing the own 
country cost of emission reductions to the country making the reduction. This will, in 
turn, increase the willingness to participate in global emission reductions negotiations.          12
3.  Model calibration 
We calibrate our model to a base case business as usual (BAU) scenario for the 
period 2006-2056 for the eight region country grouping, Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
US, EU, Japan, and ROW(the rest of the world).   
We use GDP growth as a measure of potential change in consumption by country 
over the period. We first assume that country growth rates in the period 2000-2056 
remain unchanged over the whole period of 50 years between 2006 and 2056. A 
cumulative trade pattern data is constructed by assuming that country’s imports and 
exports both grow at the same rate as the BAU path. We firstly project China’s 
imports and exports given its assumed 0.07 growth rate, and then omit it to calculate 
India’s exports and imports with an assumed growth rate of 0.06, and then Russia, 
Brazil, USA, EU, Japan and the rest of the world (Row) given assumed BAU trade 
growth rates of 0.06, 0.04, 0.02, 0.015, 0.015 and 0.015 respectively (see table 1). By 
construction, the total world trade of balance is zero along the BAU. 
 We then calibrate a temperature change function for an assumed BAU 
temperature change over the period drawn from key literature sources, including Stern 
(2006) and Mendelsohn (2007) and preferences are determined for each country using 
alternative damage estimates for the same sources. 
      All the data for each time period are projected based on the data for 2006(Tables 1 
and 2). We have three types of data: base case data in 2006, created cumulative trade 
pattern data for 2056 given BAU growth in trade, and cumulative trade pattern data 
relative to the base year (changes of cumulative trade pattern data). We also use a 
discount factor in modifying the effective growth rate for different timeframes and use 
a PPP measure of GDP in sensitivity analysis.   
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Table 1 Bilateral Merchandise Trade of the Major Entities (2006) (billion $) 















Exp  BOT 
Brazil Imp  1025.89  0.77  1.53  7.67 19.94  23.01 3.16 39.79  41.58   
Russia Imp  3.77  846.29  1.15  16.06 8.03 75.22 9.67 49.98  140.65   
India Imp  1.05  2.97  966.40  14.86  10.32 30.95  4.55 110.15  -54.59   
China Imp  12.91  17.55  10.28  2467.21  59.31 90.33  115.67  485.41  177.48   
U.S. Imp  28.04  20.74  22.99  305.81 14045.02 339.84  152.28  1049.74 -881.15 
E.U. Imp  32.91  148.70  28.05  240.51 220.63  10852.57  95.88  931.13 -216.15 
Japan Imp  5.09  6.66  4.06  118.59 69.46  59.87  4298.08  315.85 70.36   
ROW Imp  53.71  107.13  52.20  265.44  650.59 862.44 268.72  13960.45  721.82   
Notes: (1) The trade data for US, EU, Japan, and China are collected directly from website of WTO; (2) Data for 
India, Russia, and Brazil were calculated based on world data WTO website and proportion data from 
EUROSTAT; (3) The exports and imports of each pair of countries are not exactly the same, and we keep the 
import data of each country; (4) The export data of each country is the imports data of the trade partner. 
 
 
Table 2 Bilateral Merchandise Trade of the Major Entities (2006) (billion $) 
  with BRICs as a whole 
  BRIC export  U.S Exp  E.U. Exp  Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
BRIC import  5396.36  15768.625  12639.349  11479.851  23779.461  305.12 
U.S. import  14914.71  14045.019  339.839 152.279 1049.736  -881.15 
E.U. import  11619.25  220.629  10852.568 95.883  931.13 -216.149 
Japan import  4561.80  69.457 59.874  4298.078  315.854  70.357 
ROW import  2260.23  650.588  862.444  268.718  13960.45  721.822 
Notes: (1) The trade data for US, EU, Japan are collected directly from website of WTO; (2) Data for BRICs were 
calculated based on Table 1; (3) The exports and imports of each pair of countries are not exactly the same, and we 










      14
Table 3 Total output and emission intensity data and projections to 2056 
 Brazil  Russia  India  China  U.S  E.U.  Japan  ROW  Total 
Output 2004 
(Trillion)  0.664 0.592 0.667 2.254  11.712 13.044 4.608  8.048  - 
Emission 2004 
(Billion Metric Tons)  0.332 1.525 1.343 5.009 6.050 3.841  1.258  7.880  - 
Emission intensity 2004  0.500  2.577  2.012 2.222 0.517  0.294  0.273  0.979  - 
Average growth rate    0.04  0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02  0.015  0.015  0.015 - 
Average growth rate after 
discount before 2036  0.03 0.045  0.045  0.055  0.015 0.01 0.01  0.015  - 
Average growth rate after 
discount for 2037-2056  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.005  0.005  0.01  - 
Assumed PPP index 
(base on 2007 by WB)  1.40 1.60 2.50 2.10 1.00 0.85  0.95  1.35  - 
Output in 2006   
( 2006
i RS )  1.067 0.987 0.912 2.645  13.164 10.636 4.368  14.682 48.46 
Emission in 2006 
( 2006
i E Δ )  0.53   2.54   1.83   5.88   6.81   3.13   1.19   14.37   36.29  
Accu. Output by 2036 
( 2036
i RS )   33.63 62.22 58.64  244.22  176.30  112.05 48.58  179.39 915.03 
Accu. Output by 2056 
( 2056
i RS )  130.83 298.86 281.40  1322.87  573.28 368.85  169.64  647.25  3792.98 
Accu. Output by 2056   
With PPP measure 
(PPP  2056
i RS ) 
183.16 478.18 703.50  2778.03  573.28 313.52  161.16  874.15  6064.98 
Accu. Output by 2056 
with discount 
(discount 2056
i RS ) 
52.31 93.94 88.42  435.93  280.78 140.48 63.57  359.62  1515.04 
Accu. Output by 2086 
( 2106
i RS )  616.68 2065.93  1940.94  11450.25  2003.01 1423.52 779.82  3184.88  23465.04 
Accu. emis. By 2036 
( 2036
i E Δ )  16.82  160.34 117.99 542.65 91.15 32.94  13.26  175.63  1150.77 
Accu. emis. By 2056 
( 2056
i E Δ )  65.42 770.16  566.18  2939.42  296.39 108.44 46.31  633.92  5426.23 
Accu. Emis by 2056 with 
PPP measure 
 (PPP  2056
i E Δ ) 
91.58 1232.26  1415.44  6172.78  296.39 92.18 44.00  855.79  10200.41 
Accu. emis. by 2056   
with discount 
(Discount 2056
i E Δ ) 
26.16  242.09 177.89 968.63 145.16 41.30 17.35  352.07  1970.65 
Accu. emis. by 2086 
( 2106
i E Δ )  308.34 5323.91  3905.17  25442.45  1035.56  418.52 212.89  3118.00  39764.83 
Notes: (1) GDP 2004 output data from the website of World Bank; (2) All the data for the different time periods in 
this table are obtained by deducting base year data. Emission data is total output data times emission intensity. We 
assume emission intensity does not change over the different timeframes.      15
Table 4 Cumulative projected trade data by 2056 (trillion $) 
  Brazil Exp Russia Exp  India Exp China Exp U.S Exp  E.U. Exp  Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
Brazil Imp  162.88  0.24  0.47  3.34 3.17 3.65 0.50  6.32 8.42 
Russia Imp  1.16  260.45  0.35  6.99 2.47  23.15 2.98 15.38  43.48 
India Imp  0.32  0.91  297.42  6.46 3.17 9.52 1.40 33.90  -17.38 
China Imp  5.62  7.64  4.47  1073.20 25.80  39.29  50.32  211.14 77.20 
U.S. Imp  4.45  6.38  7.08  133.02  1211.68 29.32  13.14  90.56 -168.18
E.U. Imp  5.22  45.76  8.63  104.62  19.03 811.64  7.17  69.64 -86.17 
Japan Imp  0.81  2.05  1.25  51.58 5.99  4.48 321.44  23.62 5.82 
ROW Imp  8.53  32.97  16.06  115.46 56.13  64.50  20.10 1044.08  136.82
Notes: Cumulative trade pattern by 2056 data is constructed by assuming that country’s import and export both 
grow at the same rate as the BAU path. We get China’s import and export data first given 0.07 growth rate, and 
then omit it to calculate the India’s export and import with a growth rate of 0.06 and so forth. We assume that the 
total world trade of balance is zero and in this table don’t consider a discount factor 
 
 
Table 5 Cumulative projected trade data by 2056 (trillion $) with BRICs as a whole 
by 2056 trillion  BRIC export  U.S Exp  E.U. Exp  Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
BRIC import  1831.92  34.61  75.62  55.19  266.74  111.72 
U.S. import  150.93  1211.68  29.32 13.14 90.56  -168.18 
E.U. import  164.24  19.03  811.64  7.17  69.64  -86.17 
Japan import  55.69  5.99 4.48  321.44  23.62 5.82 
ROW import  173.02  56.13  64.50  20.10  1044.08  136.82 
Note: Data for BRIC were calculated based on Table 4;   
 
 
Table 6 Changes in cumulative projected trade data by 2056 (trillion $)   
with 2006 as base year 
 
  Brazil Exp Russia Exp  India Exp  China Exp U.S Exp E.U. Exp Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
Brazil Imp  111.59  0.20  0.40  2.95 2.17 2.50 0.34  4.33 6.34 
Russia Imp  0.97  218.14  0.30  6.18 2.07  19.39  2.49 12.88  36.44 
India Imp  0.27  0.77  249.10  5.72 2.66 7.98 1.17 28.39  -14.65 
China Imp  4.97  6.76  3.96  949.84 22.84 34.78 44.53  186.87 68.33 
U.S. Imp  3.05  5.34  5.93  117.73 509.43 12.33  5.52  38.07  -124.12
E.U. Imp  3.58  38.33  7.23  92.59 8.00  269.01  2.38  23.08  -75.36 
Japan Imp  0.55  1.72  1.05  45.65 2.52 1.48  106.54 7.83  2.30 
ROW Imp  5.84  27.61  13.45  102.19 23.60 21.38  6.66  346.05 100.72 
Notes: Taking 2006 as the base year, changes in the cumulative trade pattern by 2056 data are obtained by using 
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Table 7 Changes in cumulative projected trade data by 2056 (trillion $)   
with BRICs as a whole and 2006 as base year 
 
by 2056 trillion  BRIC export  U.S Exp  E.U. Exp  Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
BRIC import  1562.10  29.73 64.64  48.54 232.48 96.46  
U.S. import  132.05  509.43  12.33  5.52  38.07  -124.12  
E.U.  import  141.73 8.00  269.01 2.38  23.08 -75.36  
Japan import  48.97  2.52  1.48  106.54  7.83  2.30  
ROW import  149.10  23.60  21.38  6.66  346.05  100.72  
Note: Data for BRIC were calculated based on Table 6;   
 
 
Table 8 Cumulative projected trade data by 2056 (trillion $) adjusted with discount factor   
 
  Brazil Exp Russia Exp  India Exp China Exp U.S Exp  E.U. Exp  Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
Brazil Imp  96.32  0.10  0.20  1.36 1.87 2.16 0.30  3.74 4.43 
Russia Imp  0.49  110.80  0.15  2.84 1.05 9.85 1.27  6.54  18.48 
India Imp  0.14  0.39  126.53  2.63 1.35 4.05 0.60 14.42  -7.36 
China Imp  2.28  3.10  1.82  436.36 10.49  15.98  20.46  85.85 31.39 
U.S. Imp  2.63  2.71  3.01  54.09 956.14 23.14  10.37  71.46 -88.61
E.U.  Imp  3.09 19.47 3.67 42.54 15.02  647.03 5.72  55.51  -34.86
Japan Imp  0.48  0.87  0.53  20.97 4.73  3.57 256.25  18.83 4.74 
ROW  Imp  5.04 14.03 6.83 46.95 44.29 51.42 16.02 950.38  71.78 
Notes: The same calculation method as the data construction in Table 6, but with different discount factor for two 
period 2006-2036 and 2036-2056, assumed that after 2036, economy growth rate a little bit slower than before. 
 
 
Table 9 Changes in cumulative projected trade data by 2056 (trillion $)   
adjusted with discount factor with 2006 as base year 
 
  Brazil Exp Russia Exp  India Exp China Exp U.S Exp E.U. Exp  Japan Exp  ROW Exp  BOT 
Brazil Imp  45.03  0.06  0.12  0.97 0.88 1.01 0.14  1.75 2.35 
Russia Imp  0.31  68.49  0.09  2.04 0.65 6.09 0.78  4.04  11.45 
India  Imp  0.08  0.24 78.21 1.89 0.83 2.50 0.37  8.91  -4.63 
China Imp  1.64  2.23  1.30  313.00 7.52  11.46 14.67  61.58 22.52 
U.S. Imp  1.23  1.68  1.86  38.80 253.89  6.14  2.75  18.98 -44.55
E.U.  Imp  1.44 12.03 2.27 30.51 3.99  104.40 0.92  8.96  -24.05
Japan Imp  0.22  0.54  0.33  15.04  1.26 0.58  41.35 3.04 1.22 
ROW Imp  2.36  8.67  4.22  33.68  11.76 8.30  2.58 252.36  35.69 
Notes: Taking 2006 as the base year, changes in the cumulative trade pattern by 2056 data adjusted with discount 
factor are obtained by using the cumulative trade pattern given by 2056 data adjusted with discount factor minus 
50 times the 2006 data. 
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3.2 Calibration of parameters with real data 
We next turn to the calibration of preference parameters. 
3.2.1 Calibration of  β in utility function (equation (1)) 
We begin with  β   in the utility function (assumed the same across countries) 
       (,) * ( ) ii i
CT
UU R CT R C
C
β −Δ
=Δ =             
        According to the Stern Review (2005), Mendelssohn (2006) and other literature, 
the damage cost of emissions with BAU paths ranges from 1 to 20% of GDP out to 
2050, which we treat as a utility change of the same proportion and use it to calibrate 
the preference parameters. Without temperature change, the utility function is: 
           
*
ii UR C =                                  ( 1 8 )  
        And with damage we have :   
          





=                           ( 1 9 )  
With temperature change, there will be a loss from damage. The relative utility 
will be 1 minus the percentage the damage cost. We can calibrate  β  with equation 
above and given different values of C given a time period of 50 years as the base case 
yields Table 10. When damage cost increases,  β becomes bigger. Increasing the value 
of C, the critical damage cost for  1.00 β =  becomes  smaller.  
In our simulation analysis, we use C=10 as the base case, and do sensitivity 
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Table 10 Calibration of parameter    β  
α   1-damage cost  β  
1  0.99   0.014  
1  0.90   0.152  
1 0.85  0.234   
1  0.80   0.322  
1 0.75  0.807   
If C=10 
1 0.50  1.000 
α   1-damage cost  β  
1  0.99   0.035  
1  0.95   0.178  
1  0.90   0.366  
1 0.85  0.565   
1  0.80   0.776  
If C=20 
1 0.75  1.000 
α   1-damage cost  β  
1 0.990  0.055   
1 0.900  0.578   
1 0.850  0.891   
1 0.840  0.956   
1 0.835  0.989   
By 2056 
If C=30 
1 0.833  1.000   
 
3.2.2 Calibration of a and b in temperature change function                     
The temperature change function is written as a function of emission changes. We 
treat it as a power function of total emission change (not output) of the world:     




Ta E Δ= Δ ∑                         ( 2 0 )  
   Based on the results from Stern Review (2005), the BAU path of emissions will 
lead to about 3 degree temperature increases around the year 2035, and near 5 degree 
C by around 2050. For simplification, we assume that zero growth in the global 
economy will lead to no temperature change.   
With the data on growth rates and emission intensities for each relevant country, 
we can calibrate the parameters a and b. We have the data for year 2006 and 
simulation data for 2036 and 2056. For simplicity, we choose 2006 as the base year, 
and assume that 30 years later, that is by 2036, the global average temperature will 
increase 3 degrees, and 5 degrees by 2056. We assume that the BAU path implies 
output growth for each country slightly lower than that of 2000-2006, while emission      19
intensities are unchanged from 2006. 
        We use a three point calibration based on equations (20):     
           0 (36.2874 )
b a =                          ( 2 1 )  
          
2036 (1150.78)
b Ta Δ=                       ( 2 2 )  
          
2056 (5426.24)
b Ta Δ=                       ( 2 3 )  
This gives different results for a and b given different BAU temperature changes,     
 
Table 11 Calibration results for parameters a and b  
a 0.294 
2036 3 T Δ=  
2056 5 T Δ=  
b 0.329 
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4.  Model Experiments Results 
4.1 Trade sanctions 
      We first analyze the effects of trade sanctions (tariffs) on participation decisions. 
We evaluate the welfare impacts on countries of the discrete choice of participating 
and facing no sanction, or not participating. Countries will join only when the tariff 
makes their welfare level lower than that of taking on reduction commitments.   
   Table 12 present results for individual countries. For Brazil if the tariff used 
by all other countries against Brazil is smaller than 240%, Brazil is not willing to 
join the agreement. With the increased tariff, by avoiding this joint action, Brazil 
benefits more. But the effectiveness of these measures also depends on who uses 
tariffs against Brazil. If only developed countries (US, EU and Japan) are 
involved, only thousands percent or more tariffs can induce Brazil’s participation. 
If developing countries like India, Russia, China and others also jointly take 
action, a smaller tariff of 240% can suffice. Russia and China provide similar 
results to Brazil. For Russia, if all other countries use tariffs against her to 
participate, 75% is enough, but 240% needed if only used by the developed 
countries (US, EU and Japan). The tariff needed to induce China’s participation is 
259.3% if used by all other countries, and almost 922%, if only used by 
developed countries. If the developing country is a net importer, like India, the 
tariff has no effect on her. Compared with the net exporters, like China, Russia 
and Brazil, India presents a different story. 
    Taking the BRICs as a whole, in Table 13, a 383% tariff by all non BRIC 
regions can induce the BRICs’ to join the agreement. If only used by developed 
country, a tariff of more than 1150% is needed.   
      21
Table 12: Impacts of tariffs against all developing countries on their non participation    
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion) 
  T a r i f f 
Brazil's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by all non Brazil regions 
Brazil's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by US, EU, Japan only 
0% -4.746  -4.746 
50% -3.584  -4.386 
100% -2.172  -4.165 
240%  0.024  -3.835 
6370% 5.122  0.020 
  T a r i f f 
Russia's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by all non Russia regions 
Russia's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by US, EU, Japan only 
0% -8.436  -8.436 
50% -2.657  -5.683 
75%  0.007  -4.646 
150% 7.423  -2.319 
270% 18.170  0.042 
  T a r i f f 
  China's welfare changes from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by all non china regions 
  China's welfare changes from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by US, EU, Japan only 
0% -24.423  -24.423 
50% -18.357  -20.681 
259.3%  0.006  -11.449 
900% 35.723  -0.218 
922% 36.720  0.004 
  T a r i f f 
India's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by all non India regions 
India's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by US, EU, Japan only 
0% -8.955  -8.955 
50% -10.518  -9.571 
100% -12.778  -10.203 
Note: (1) Given 10% damage cost. (2) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (3) The timeframe is to 2056, and 
with temperature change 5 degree.   
 
Table 13: Impacts of tariffs against BRIC as a whole on its non participation   
Tariff 
BRIC's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by non-BRIC regions 
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion) 
BRIC's welfare change from participation and 
avoiding joint tariff by US, EU, Japan only 
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion) 
0% -34.366    -34.366 
50% -27.918  -29.721 
250% -9.399  -18.375 
383%  0.010  -13.666 
500% 7.301  -10.451 
1150% 39.505  0.076 
Note: (1) Given 10% damage cost. (2) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (3) The timeframe is to 2056, and 
with temperature change 5 degree.        22
4.2 Financial transfers   
We next consider the impact of conditional financial transfers on country 
participation decisions. We assume that only the EU, US, and Japan make such 
transfers. Recipient countries have an incentive to join the agreement only when they 
get compensation from EU, US and Japan, which covers losses from taking on 
reduction targets.   
From Tables 14-17, we find that, given an assumed 10% damage cost, if the 
transfer from developed countries to developing country is small and less than 3% of 
the country’s GDP, BRICs may have no willingness to join the agreement. Only when 
transfers are large enough (6.3 US$trillion or almost 5% Brazil GDP to Brazil, 13.5 
US$trillion or 4.8% Russia GDP to Russia, 12.9 US$trillion or 4.8% India GDP to 
India, and 45 US$trillion or 3.6% Chinese GDP to China), do these countries have an 
incentive. In term of transferring countries’ (US, EU, Japan) GDP level, each needs to 
transfer almost 5% GDP to China, 1.22% GDP to India, 1.28% GDP to Russia, or 
0.6% GDP to Brazil to encourage their participation.   
The size of transfers also depends on how large the damage cost of temperature 
change is. If the damage cost is very large, a small transfer will induce developing 
country to join. 
The timeframe to achieve the transfer by developing countries also influences the 
participation decision. The earlier they get the financial transfer, the smaller the 
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Table 14: Size of Financial Transfers needed to encourage Brazil’s participation   
Brazil’s welfare changes with different damage cost 
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion)    
5% 10% 20% 
1.5 
(1.21% India GDP)  -5.074  -5.329  -5.927 
3 
(2.41% India GDP)  -3.496  -3.662  -4.053 
6.3 
(5.07% India GDP)  -0.021  0.004  0.072 
Total size of 
transfer to China 
over 50 years 
($ trillion) 
15 
(5.6% India GDP)  9.135  9.669  10.941 
Each 0.5% 
(US: 2.72, EU 1.75，Jap 0.81)   
-1.095  -1.129  -1.204 
Each 0.6% 
(US: 5.44, EU 3.50, Jap 1.60)  0.011  0.037  0.110 
Transfer 
proportional to US, 
EU and Japan’s 
individual  GDP   
over 50 years  Each 1% 
(US: 6.64, EU 4.31, Jap 1.98)  4.463  4.738  5.394 
30 years  16.212  17.428  20.400 
50 years  9.135  9.669  10.941 
Change period of 
analysis to 
80 years  -106.302  -103.926  -98.923 
Note: (1) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (2) Given temperature change by 2056 is 5 degree. (3) Financial 
transfer only from developed countries US, EU and Japan to developing countries. （4）Change period of analysis 
is with assumed 15 trillion transferred from developed country to the country. 
 
Table 15: Size of Financial Transfers needed to encourage Russia participation 
Russia’s welfare changes with different damage cost 
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion)    
5% 10% 20% 
3  
(1.1% Russia GDP)  -11.157  -11.117  -10.895 
9 
(3.3% Russia GDP)  -5.074  -4.703  -3.695 
13.5 
(4.8% Russia GDP)  -0.510  0.110  1.709 
Total size of 
transfer to China 
over 50 years 
($ trillion) 
15 
(5.6% Russia GDP)  1.011  1.715  3.511 
Each 0.5% 
(US: 2.72, EU 1.75, Jap 0.81)    -8.842  -8.676  -8.153 
Each 1% 
(US: 5.44, EU 3. 5, Jap 1.6)  -3.482  -3.023  -1.808 
Each 1.28% 
(US: 6.97, EU 4.49, Jap 2.06)  -0.477  0.145  1.748 
Transfer 
proportional to US, 
EU and Japan’s 
individual  GDP    
over 50 years 
Each 1.5% 
(US: 8.17, EU 5.26 , Jap 2.42)  1.889  2.640  4.549 
30 years  9.666  10.398  12.191 
50 years  1.011  1.715  3.511 
Change period of 
analysis to 
80 years  -853.336  -848.648  -837.542 
Note: (1) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (2) Given temperature change by 2056 is 5 degree. (3) Financial 
transfer only from developed countries US, EU and Japan to developing countries. （4） Change period of analysis is 
with assumed 15 trillion transferred from developed country to the country.      24
 
 
Table 16: Size of Financial Transfers needed to encourage India’s participation 
India’s welfare changes with different damage cost 
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion)    
5% 10% 20% 
3  
(1.1% India GDP)  -11.496  -11.570  -11.635 
9 
(3.3% India GDP)  -4.757  -4.466  -3.662 
12.9 
(4.8% India GDP)  -0.379  0.152  1.520 
Total size of 
transfer to China 
over 50 years 
($ trillion) 
15 
(5.6% India GDP)  1.979  2.637  4.310 
Each 0.5% 
(US: 2.72, EU 1.75, Jap 0.81)    -8.943  -8.878  -8.614 
Each 1% 
(US: 5.44, EU 3. 5, Jap 1.6)  -3.020  -2.634  -1.606 
Each 1.22% 
(US: 6.64, EU 4.31, Jap 1.98)  -0.420  0.110  1.473 
Transfer 
proportional to US, 
EU and Japan’s 
individual  GDP   
over 50 years 
Each 1.5% 
(US: 8.17, EU 5.26, Jap 2.42)  2.911  3.621  5.414 
30 years  12.343  13.340  15.802 
50 years  1.979  2.637  4.310 
Change period of 
analysis to 
80 years  -699.568  -668.914  -605.644 
Note: (1) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (2) Given temperature change by 2056 is 5 degree. (3) Financial 
transfer only from developed countries US, EU and Japan to developing countries. （4）Change period of analysis 
is with assumed 15 trillion transferred from developed country to the country. 
 
Table 17: Size of Financial Transfers needed to encourage Chinese participation   
China’s welfare changes with different damage cost 
(US$ trillion)    
5% 10% 20% 
3  
(0.24% Chinese GDP)  -54.436  -46.150  -24.546 
15 
(1.19% Chinese GDP)  -41.918  -33.022  -9.990 
30 
(2.39% Chinese GDP)  -26.266  -16.612  8.203 
Total size of 
transfer to China 
over 50 years 
($ trillion) 
45.3 
(3.6% Chinese GDP)  -10.304  0.126  26.763 
Each 0.5% 
(US: 2.72, EU 1.75, Jap 0.81)    -52.055  -43.651  -21.770 
Each 1% 
(US: 5.44, EU 3. 5, Jap 1.6)  -46.544  -37.869  -15.355 
Each 3% 
(US: 16.3, EU 10.5 , Jap 4.8)  -24.498  -14.743  10.312 
Each 5% 
(US: 27.2, EU 17.5, Jap 8.1)  -2.439  8.394  35.989 
Transfer 
proportional to US, 
EU and Japan’s 
individual  GDP   
over 50 years 
Each 7.5% 
(US: 40.8, EU 26.3, Jap 12.1)  25.689  38.145  69.599 
30 years  5.929  7.096  10.143 
50 years  -41.918  -33.022  -9.990 
Change period of 
analysis to 
80 years  -509.888  -349.677  -162.433 
Note: (1) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (2) Given temperature change by 2056 is 5 degree. (3) Financial 
transfer only from developed countries US, EU and Japan to developing countries. （4） Change period of analysis is      25
with assumed 15 trillion transferred from developed country to the country. 
 
From Table 18, we find that developed countries make transfers to one country 
may lead to other developing countries being better off. And in some cases (transfers 
to China), financial transfers not only increase developing countries’ welfare, but 
developed countries themselves as well due to the emission reduction effect. 
 
Table 18: Impacts of financial transfer to a country on other regions welfare 
(Hicksian CV in US$ trillion) 
 
 US$3  trillion 
transfer to Brazil   
US$3 trillion 
transfer to Russia   
US$3 trillion 
transfer to India   
US$3 trillion 
transfer to China   
Brazil  (-3.662)  0.560  0.407  2.022 
Russia  0.019  (-11.117)  0.747  4.159 
India  0.162  1.466  (-11.570)  5.120 
China  0.346  5.722  4.103  (-46.150) 
US  -0.654  2.521  1.792  10.154 
EU  -0.863  1.122  0.691  6.344 
Japan  -1.036  -0.314  -0.524  1.697 
others  -0.014  2.279  1.449  8.066 
Note: (1) Given 10% damage cost. (2) Assumed 50% emission cut globally. (3) Given temperature change 
by 2056 5 degree. (4) Financial transfer only from developed country US, EU and Japan to developing countries. 
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis   
We next consider the impact of model assumptions on country participation 
decisions.  
In Tables 19, with tariffs as sanctions, different trade elasticities have different 
impacts on BRICs’ participation decisions. Across the countries, compared to Russia 
and Brazil, China is more sensitive to trade elasticities. The larger the substitution 
between domestic goods and imported goods (keeping the second-level substitution 
elasticity unchanged 0.9 m σ = ,  σ   increases from 0.5 to 1.2), the more the 
willingness to join the agreement. The more the substitution elasticity among different 
imported goods (keeping the first-level substitution elasticity 0.5 σ =  unchanged, 
m σ  increase from 0.5 to 0.9), the more incentive for China to take on commitments. 
When taking financial transfers as the measure for encouraging participation, in Table 
20, the substitution elasticity between traded goods in BRIC countries does not have 
much impact on country’s participation decision.   
BRICs are also insensitive to the temperature change upper-bound C. The 
increases in C only changes the tariff threshold and financial transfer threshold a little.   
But the size of the emission reduction cost  ϕ , (changes from 1 to 0.01) , does 
influence the country’s participation decision. When the reduction cost is low, 
0.01 ϕ = (nearly zero reduction cost), most BRIC countries are willing to join the 
agreement. But with larger reduction cost of  1 ϕ = , only large tariffs and financial 
transfer encourage participation.   
We also vary the discount factor we assume. In this case, the benefit from 
avoiding tariffs and from receiving financial transfers both increase for all BRIC 
countries compared to the no discount case. Smaller tariffs or financial transfers will 
induce participation.        27
When considering PPP measures of GDP, we find that both the tariff threshold 
and the size of financial transfer increase compared to the non-PPP case.   
 
Table 19 Sensitivity of threshold tariffs by all countries   











0.5 σ =  
0.5 m σ =   238% 72%  133.1% 
0.5 σ =  
0.9 m σ =   240% 75%  259.3% 
Changing trade 
elasticity 
, m σ σ  
1.2 σ =  
0.9 m σ =   235% 71% 160% 
10 240%  75%  259.3% 




30  242% 76% 282% 
1  7500% 9800% 6500% 




0.01 0%  0%  0% 
Without 
PPP  240% 75%  259.3%  Use of PPP 
measure for China 
(based on 2007 PPP 
GDP by WB)  With PPP  420%  132%  508% 
without 
discount  240% 75%  259.3% 
Assumed discount 
factor in DPV 
calculation of GDP  With 
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Table 20 Sensitivity of threshold financial transfers from developed country   
to key model parameters 
 








Financial transfer to 
India under different 
parameters 
(US$ trillion) 
Financial transfer to 
China under different 
parameters 
(US$ trillion) 
0.5 σ =  
0.5 m σ =   6.15  13.2 12.60 44.4 
0.5 σ =  
0.9 m σ =   6.30  13.5 12.80 45.3 
Changing trade 
elasticity 
, m σ σ  
1.2 σ =  
0.9 m σ =   6.24 13.35  12.75 45.0 
10  6.3  13.5 12.80 45.3 
20  6.3  13.7 12.84 46.7 
Varied temperature 
change up-bound (C) 
30  6.3  13.9 12.90 48.0 
1 40.65  90.9  98.10  392.4 




0.01  0.6 0 0.3 0 
Without 
PPP  6.3 13.5  12.80  45.3  Use of PPP measure 
for China 
(based on 2007 PPP 
GDP by WB)  With PPP  9.3  20.7  21.00  73.2 
without 
discount  6.3 13.5  12.80  45.3 
Assumed discount 
factor in DPV 
calculation of GDP  With 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we discuss the participation of Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(BRIC) in global environmental negotiations.   
Our result shows that these countries either singly or collectively will not enter 
negotiations unless damages from climate change are dramatic. Trade sanctions can 
induce developing countries participation in global environmental negotiations, but 
these are only effective when the non OECD country is a net exporter, as with China, 
Russia and Brazil or BRICs as a whole. The effect of trade sanctions also depends on 
many factors, such as who imposes the tariff, how long is the timeframe, trade 
elasticities, discount rate, PPP measures, and temperature change threshold etc.. The 
balance of results however indicate that compliance inducing tariffs would need to be 
very large (many hundreds of percent). 
The results also show that financial transfers from developed countries to 
developing countries can encourage developing countries’ joining in the agreement 
but the transfers would need to be large: the larger of the transfer, the more likelihood 
that commitments will be made. But the larger the damage from climate change, the 
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